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THE  NATURE  OF  AMERICAN  TERRITORIAL  EXPANSION 

By  Pitman  B.  Potter 

Assistant  Professor  of  Political  Science ,  University  of  Wisconsin 

( 

America  has  been  commonly  portrayed  by  American  statesmen  and 
politicians,  even  in  fervid  Independence  Day  orations,  as  a  nation  whose 
policy  is  ever  for  peace,  and  as  a  nation  harboring  no  imperialistic  aims. 
A  certain  group  of  thinkers — or  feelers — have  boasted  of  the  extreme 
pacifism  and  righteousness  of  America  in  this  way  in  order  to  intensify 
and  reinforce  and  promote  those  policies  for  the  future.  These  good  people 
have  hoped  to  see  America  lead  the  way  to  a  repudiation  of  militaristic 
methods  and  the  gospel  of  conquest.  Such  are  the  pacifists,  the  church 
people,  the  reformers.  A  second  group  of  people  have  firmly  believed  that, 
in  actual  fact,  the  record  compelled  and  imposed  on  them  such  an  inter¬ 
pretation  of  American  policy.  They  have  felt  that  the  causes  were  only 
in  part  the  voluntary  preferences  of  the  American  people,  and  they  have 
seen  the  importance  to  be  attached,  in  interpreting  the  American  policy, 
to  the  geographical  and  economic  conditions  determining  the  character 
of  American  growth  and  policies.  But  to  whatever  cause  it  has  been  due, 
and  largely  because  it  can  be  traced  back  to  a  deeper  and  firmer  founda¬ 
tion  and  source  than  mere  popular  preferences,  these  students  of  American 
foreign  policy  have  subscribed,  and  still  subscribe,  to  the  belief  that  the 
American  practice  in  the  matter  of  territorial  expansion  has  been  charac¬ 
terized  by  a  lack  of  imperialism,  of  militarism,  and  of  a  lust  for  conquest 
such  as  has  been  manifested  by  certain  European  Powers  from  time  to 
time  in  the  past.  Their  opinion  is  entitled  to  respect.  It  is,  moreover, 
useful,  even  indispensable,  to  have  an  accurate  idea  of  the  quality  of 
American  foreign  policy  in  the  coming  days  in  order  not,  certainly,  to 
expect  too  much  of  America,  and  also,  just  as  certainly,  to  be  able  to 
utilize  all  the  potential  energy  for  good  in  international  politics  which 
America  may  be  able  to  provide. 

The  transports  and  boastings,  and  what  have  amounted  to  the  spiritual 
excesses  of  those  who  have  painted  America  as  a  pacifist  and  a  saint  among 
nations,  have  produced  in  certain  quarters  a  feeling  of  revolt  and  a  reaction 
against  the  traditional  view  of  the  matter.  In  certain  cases  the  result  is  a 
mild,  amused,  somewhat  cynical,  somewhat  wise  and  sophisticated  skepti¬ 
cism  as  to  the  peaceable  and  righteous  character  of  the  American  mood. 
In  other  cases  the  result  is  a  fiat  denial  of  the  American  tradition,  a 

189 


190 


THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


direct  contradiction  of  its  conclusions,  and  an  attempt  to  place  America 
on  all  fours  with  the  other  members  of  the  family  of  nations  on  the  score 
of  territorial  expansion. 

Of  the  first  sort  is  the  case  of  Professor  J.  B.  Moore,  who,  after  taking 
note  of  the  traditional  pictures  of  American  policy  “as  conventionalized 
in  the  annual  messages  of  Presidents  to  Congress/’  and,  he  might  have 
added,  in  countless  public  documents  and  private  addresses,  goes  on  to 
say,  in  his  treatment  of  the  principles  of  American  foreign  policy:  “Never¬ 
theless,  in  spite  of  their  quiet  propensities,  it  has  fallen  to  their  lot,  since 
they  forcibly  achieved  their  independence,  to  have  had,  prior  to  that  whose 
existence  was  declared  April  6,  1917,  four  foreign  wars,  three  general  and 
one  limited,  and  the  greatest  civil  war  in  history,  and  to  have  acquired  a 
territorial  domain  almost  five  times  as  great  as  the  respectable  endowment 
with  which  they  began  their  national  career.”  This  gently  implies,  of 
course,  that  the  conventional  picture  is  inaccurate,  at  least  in  its  emphasis 
or  intensity. 

Further  still  to  the  left  we  have  Mr.  J.  A.  R.  Marriott,  who,  in  a 
recent  article  in  the  Edinburgh  Review ,  concludes  that  “the  American 
record  of  expansion  does  not  fall  behind  that  of  the  principal  European 
Powers,”  and  that,  in  the  words  of  Professor  Ramsey  Muir,  who  is  quoted 
with  approval  by  Mr.  Marriott,  “the  imperialist  spirit  was  working  as 
powerfully  in  the  communities  of  the  New  World  as  in  the  monarchies 
of  Europe.” 

The  method  of  approach  and  the  objectives  of  Mr.  Marriott’s  treatment 
must  be  borne  in  mind.  He  begins  by  deploring  that  “illusions  about 
America  die  hard,”  and  that  “as  a  rule  it  takes  longer  to  kill  them”  in 
Europe  than  at  home.  He  then  sets  out  to  do  the  killing.  After  following 
the  argument  for  some  distance  in  a  more  or  less  systematic  way,  the 
author  begins  to  reorient  his  treatment.  He  is  no  longer  interested  in 
killing  an  illusion,  but  in  portraying  what  appears  to  him  now,  after  his 
review  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  a  “new  departure  in  American  diplo¬ 
macy.”  He  concludes  that  America  came  out  of  her  isolation  in  1895  or 
1898  and  began  to  take  part  in  world  politics.  What  is  now  felt  by  Mr. 
Marriott  to  be  a  new  policy  of  participation  in  Welt-politik  is  portrayed 
as  a  reversal  of  the  preceding  policy.  “The  Zeit-Geist  had  proved  itself 
too  strong  even  for  the  Americans.  .  .  .  During  the  last  generation  the  world 
has  become  one  in  a  sense  of  which  no  one  dreamed  forty  years  ago  .  .  . 
the  world  has  shrunk;  and  in  the  process  of  contraction,  the  American, 
Australian,  and  African  continents  have  been  inevitably  drawn  into  the 
maelstrom  of  European  politics.” 

Thus,  in  addition  to  the  initial  motive  of  killing  an  illusion  in  the 
interests  of  truth,  Mr.  Marriott  is  in  the  end  simply  playing  a  new  varia¬ 
tion  upon  the  now  familiar  theme  of  the  growing  contact  and  inter-relation 
of  the  nations.  Indeed,  the  latter  idea  bids  fair  to  become  as  stereotyped 


THE  NATURE  OF  AMERICAN  TERRITORIAL  EXPANSION 


191 


in  a  few  years  as  the  tradition  of  American  isolation  and  pacifism  ever 
'  was.  Moreover,  his  second  thesis  involves  somewhat  of  a  denial  of  his 
first.  If  America  is  on  all  fours  with  the  European  Powers  only  after 
abandoning  a  policy  of  isolation  which  she  is  reputed  to  have  pursued  down 
to  1895-98,  then  during  the  preceding  period  she  must  have  lived  a  secluded 
and,  presumably,  virtuous  life.  If  she  became  worldly  in  1895-98,  she 
must  have  been  unworldly  before  that  time. 

However,  the  important  question  about  all  this  is,  of  course,  is  it  true? 
The  first  thesis  of  Mr.  Marriott  might  look  suspiciously  like  the  sinner’s 
retort,  ‘  ‘  Oh,  you  are  just  like  the  rest  of  us.  ’  ’  It  might  look  like  the 
attempt  to  drag  the  pictures  of  America  down  to  the  level  of  that  of 
imperialist  and  militarist  Europe.  There  is  probably  to  be  detected  here, 
however,  a  certain  measure  of  influence  from  the  second  of  Mr.  Marriott’s 
propositions.  We  are  all  in  the  same  game,  he  says,  at  least  since  1895; 
after  all,  haven’t  we  always  been  pretty  much  alike,  you  were  always  pretty 
much  like  us,  you  know.  In  either  case  the  question  remains:  were  we? 
Is  it  true? 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  point  is  that  of  international  imperial¬ 
ism.  The  United  States  is  not  accused  of  being  rebellious  or  turbulent, 
in  the  sense  in  which  that  accusation  is  levelled  at  Latin-American  repub¬ 
lics.  The  territorial  expansion  of  the  United  States  and  their  share  in 
imperial  world  politics  is  what  is  in  question.  Accordingly,  Professor 
Moore’s  mention  of  “the  greatest  civil  war  in  history,”  and  of  the  fact 
that  the  United  States  “forcibly  achieved  their  independence,”  is  simply 
beside  the  point  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  case. 

For  the  rest,  the  charge  may  be  put  thus:  the  United  States  has  been 
engaged  in  numerous  wars  and  has  expanded  enormously  in  territorial 
possessions;  on  these  critical  points  of  international  relations  and  foreign 
policy  America  is  not  exceptionally  righteous  by  intention,  nor  has  she 
an  exceptionally  good  record. 

On  the  first  point,  no  perplexity  whatever  need  be  felt.  The  history 
of  American  military  organization  and  the  record  of  her  wars  need  only 
be  reviewed  to  show  that  Professor  Moore’s  insinuations  are  wholly  without 
consequence.  To  begin  with,  the  United  States  has  always  been  content 
with,  and  has  positively  rejoiced  in,  a  standing  army  small  even  for  a 
much  smaller  Power,  and  in  the  use  of  the  volunteer  and  militia  systems 
of  military  organization.  That  is  notorious.  It  does  not  create  a  picture 
of  a  nation  with  military  propensities  and  predilections.  In  the  military 
life  Americans  are  amateurs — sometimes  ridiculous,  sometimes  glorious, 
but  always  amateurs. 

When  we  come  to  examine  the  numerous  wars  in  which  the  United 
States  has  been  engaged,  “three  general  and  one  limited,”  a  new  sort  of 
error  is  revealed.  The  United  States  has  been  involved  in  the  wars  against 
the  Barbary  pirate  states  in  1795-1815,  in  the  wars  of  England  and  France 


192 


THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


in  1798  and  1812,  in  a  war  upon  Mexico  in  1846,  a  war  upon  Spain  in 
1898,  and  in  the  general  European  war  in  1917.  To  make  such  a  state¬ 
ment,  however,  is  to  open  a  discussion,  not  to  close  it ;  is  to  speak  merely 
in  quantitative  terms.  It  remains  to  be  noted,  first,  that  the  wars  against 
the  Barbary  States  were  waged  in  behalf  of  a  sea  free  for  all  nations  from 
these  subsidized  marauders  of  the  Mediterranean;  second,  that  the  de  facto 
war  with  France  was  entirely  maritime  in  character,  was  extremely  brief — 
a  matter  of  six  months — and,  like  the  following  war  of  1812  (also  brief  and 
fragmentarjO?  followed  not  from  relations  arising  directly  or  primarily 
between  the  United  States  and  another  peaceful  nation,  but  from  relations 
between  the  United  States  as  a  neutral  and  one  of  two  parties  to  a  bitter 
European  struggle  during  which  the  neutral  was  put  to  it  to  defend  his 
rights  and  to  resist  encroachments  from  one  side  or  the  other.  Like  the 
War  of  1812,  also,  it  originated  in  part  from  a  determination  to  defend 
maritime  liberties  upon  which  the  next  few  years  were  to  place  the  seal 
of  approval.  These  two  wars  contrast  strongly  with  the  Mexican  War, 
which  was  offensive  and  not  defensive,  which  was  predatory  in  its  aim, 
and  was  not  undertaken  primarily  for  the  defense  or  vindication  of  legal 
rights. 

It  is  precisely  this  Mexican  War  which,  as  the  glaring  exception,  proves 
the  general  rule  regarding  the  character  of  American  wars.  Mr.  Marriott 
does  not  dwell  upon  the  disgraceful  character  of  that  war  as  fully  as  he 
might  be  pardoned  for  doing  if  he  chose.  He  does,  however,  make  a  remark 
in  regard  to  it  which  is  interesting  and  instructive.  The  Civil  War,  it 
appears,  “might  never  have  occurred  had  the  United  States  been  strictly 
limited  to  its  original  territory.”  Evidently,  in  Mr.  Marriott’s  eyes,  the 
Mexican  War  contributed  to  push  the  South  into  the  Civil  War.  On  the 
other  hand,  as  Mr.  Marriott  does  not  mention,  it  was  the  South  that  pushed 
the  nation  into  the  Mexican  War  to  secure  more  potentially  slave  territory 
in  Texas  and  the  Southwest.  That  war,  it  is  safe  to  say,  probably  would 
not  have  occurred  but  for  the  operation  of  wliat  must  be  regarded  as  an 
abnormal  and  unnatural  factor  in  American  politics.  It  is  not  character¬ 
istic  of  American  foreign  policy. 

One  does  not  need  to  go  up  into  the  wars  of  1898  and  1917  to  discover 
the  same  traits.  Let  history  judge  whether  the  United  States  entered 
either  of  her  most  recent  wars  from  a  lust  of  conquest,  military  ardor  or 
imperialistic  desires.  Rather  it  can  be  affirmed  that  the  United  States,  when 
her  policy  has  been  determined  by  the  natural  and  normal  preferences  of 
her  people,  has  never  entered  a  war  except  in  defense  of  legal  or  ethical 
rights  to  which  history  has,  as  a  matter  of  actual  recorded  fact,  paid  definite 
and  profound  respect.  So  with  her  defense  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas 
against  France  and  Britain  in  1798  and  1812,  her  defense  of  Cuban  liberty 
and  decency  and  her  own  safety  in  1898,  and  of  her  freedom  upon  the  seas 
again  in  1917.  Let  Mr.  Marriott  compare  the  war  aims  of  America  in  the 


THE  NATURE  OE  AMERICAN  TERRITORIAL  EXPANSION 


193 


recent  war  with  those  of  any  of  the  other  belligerents  and  then  answer 
whether  American  participation  in  that  war  proved  her  to  be  imperialistic, 
as  nations  go  in  this  year  of  grace,  or  otherwise. 

The  discussion  of  war  aims,  however,  leads  us  over  to  our  principal  prob¬ 
lem,  namely,  the  character  of  the  territorial  expansion  of  the  United 
States.  Referring  again  to  the  Cuban  case,  did  America  undertake  the 
War  of  1898  for  conquest?  Or,  more  generally,  what  qualities  are  manifest 
in  the  territorial  expansion  of  the  United  States  from  a  petty  coastal  state 
in  1776  to  a  vast  world  Power  in  1920? 

Of  the  facts  in  the  case  there  can  be  no  doubt.  Beginning  with  the 
possession  of  the  Atlantic  coast  from  Florida  to  Maine,  the  Americans  have 
expanded  westward  to  the  Mississippi,  to  the  Rockies,  to  the  Pacific,  and 
acquired  vast  possessions  in  Alaska,  the  East  and  West  Indies  and  the 
islands  of  the  Pacific.  By  a  constant  process  of  expansion  and  acquisition 
extending  from  1783  to  1916  ‘‘the  American  empire”  has  grown  in  area 
and  in  distribution  over  the  surface  of  the  globe  until  w7e  stand  among 
those  spacious  and  far-flung  Powers  upon  whose  possessions  the  sun  never 
sets. 

Here  also,  however,  the  impression  which  Professor  Moore  and,  to  a 
greater  extent  in  this  case,  Mr.  Marriott  try  to  create  is  due  wholly  to  the 
fact  that  they  dwell  upon  the  quantitative  aspects  of  the  case  alone.  Thus, 
Mr.  Marriott  says  that  ‘  ‘  No  country  in  the  world  exhibited,  during  the  nine¬ 
teenth  century,  a  more  marked  tendency  to  territorial  expansion  than  the 
United  States.”  He  notes  further  that  in  1845  America  annexed  “a  terri¬ 
tory  more  than  four  times  as  large  as  England  and  Wales,”  and  that  in 
less  than  a  century  after  1783  the  United  States  had  “more  than  quad¬ 
rupled  in  size.” 

Now  all  of  these  quantitative  statements  are  true.  But  they  do  not  mean 
much.  Imperialism  is  not  a  matter  of  area,  any  more  than  militarism  is  a 
matter  of  the  number  of  wars  in  which  a  nation  has  been  engaged  or,  for 
that  matter,  of  the  number  of  troops  maintained  in  the  armed  forces  of 
the  nation.  China  is  larger  than  continental  United  States,  Greenland 
larger  than  all  of  western  Europe.  What  does  that  prove  regarding  the 
Danes  or  the  Chinese?  Nothing,  just  nothing.  Imperialism  and  militarism 
are  moral — or  immoral — characteristics  to  be  measured  with  more  dis¬ 
criminating  instruments  than  a  yardstick  or  a  counting  machine.  The 
area  of  Brazil  and  the  military  preparedness  of  Switzerland  do  not  con¬ 
vict  either  of  these  nations  in  the  public  mind  of  those  two  vices,  and 
properly  so. 

There  have  been,  in  the  United  States,  certain  manifestations  of  what 
might  be  called  an  imperialistic  temper.  These  were  in  evidence  specially 
from  1840  to  1850,  the  decade  of  the  “roaring  forties,”  as  these  years  have 
been  aptly  called.  The  cry  of  “Fifty-four  Forty  or  Fight,”  which  was 
raised  to  express  the  demand,  put  forward  in  the  Presidential  campaign  of 


194 


THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


1844,  for  possession  of  the  Oregon  territory  up  to  54°  40'  North  latitude, 
and  the  talk  about  the  “manifest  destiny”  of  America  to  rule  this  continent 
from  the  Northern  ice  to  the  tropic  seas,  and  so  on,  were  symptomatic  of  a 
certain  mood.  The  spectacle  of  westward  expansion  and  settlement  fired 
men’s  minds  and  loosed  their  tongues.  Our  Latin  American  neighbors,  or 
certain  more  or  less  excitable  politicians  in  and  among  them,  dwell  lovingly 
upon  the  war  of  this  period  as  proof  of  an  imperialistic  plan  to  conquer  the 
western  world,  combining  this  evidence  with  the  more  recent  expansion  of 
American  finance  and  commerce  in  these  continents  and  the  policy  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  with  which  all  of  this  is  connected  in  popular  talk.  In  the 
end  of  the  century  came  an  outburst  of  enthusiasm  for  a  place  among  the 
world  Powers  and  a  share  in  the  colonial  game. 

There  have  been  other  episodes  which  might  be  called  on  to  prove 
American  imperialism.  In  1778  we  treated  with  France  regarding  a  joint 
conquest  of  all  British  possessions  in  America.  The  Articles  of  Confedera¬ 
tion  showed  clearly  a  hope  for  the  inclusion  of  Canada  in  the  new  nation. 
This  subject  was  revived  in  1870  in  discussions  of  British  relations.  Cuba 
was  coveted  by  Adams  and  by  Jefferson  in  1823;  in  1848  we  tried  to  buy 
it;  in  1868  we  meditated  military  occupation.  We  tried  to  secure  the 
annexation  of  San  Domingo  in  1879.  Various  other  cases  could  be  cited. 

The  fact  is,  however,  that  a  decision  must  be  reached  not  by  reference 
to  what  did  not  happen,  but  by  what  did  happen,  not  by  vague  and  un¬ 
supported  aspirations  or  desires,  but  upon  decision  converted  or  attempted 
to  be  converted  into  action  or  stopped  only  by  outside  forces.  Further, 
the  character  of  American  policy  must  be  judged  by  the  long  run  of  events, 
not  by  the  sporadic  outbursts  of  1846  and  1898.  That  the  moods  of  1846  and 
1898,  engendered  largely  by  the  events  themselves,  are  so  easily  recognized, 
indeed,  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they  are  set  against  a  background  of  pre¬ 
vailingly  different  hue. 

When  we  come  to  examine  the  concrete  acquisitions  of  territory  actually 
made  by  the  United  States,  there  are  certain  very  definite  considerations 
which  sustain  these  general  impressions.  These  are  to  be  found  in  the 
manner  in  which  these  acquisitions  were  made,  the  character  of  the  terri¬ 
tories  at  the  time  when  they  were  acquired,  and  the  method  of  treatment 
accorded  to  them  after  acquisition. 

Most  of  the  territorial  acquisitions  of  the  United  States  have  resulted, 
not  from  the  use  of  armed  force,  but  by  free  cession.  That  is  the  one  great 
and  irrefutable  disproof  of  American  imperialism.  The  lands  between  the 
Appalachians  and  the  Mississippi  were  held  in  at  least  a  legal  title  in  1783 
and  possession  was  taken  by  the  natural  and  peaceful  process  of  settlement. 
Louisiana,  Florida,  Alaska,  and  the  Virgin  Islands  were  purchased ;  Texas 
and  the  Hawaiian  Islands  annexed  upon  their  own  request;  the  Oregon 
territory  acquired  by  discovery  and  settlement  and  free  diplomatic  ar¬ 
rangement  with  Britain.  Even  in  the  case  of  Florida,  where  preliminary 


THE  NATURE  OF  AMERICAN  TERRITORIAL  EXPANSION 


195 


events  gave  every  opportunity  for  a  quick  and  outright  conquest,  the 
territory  was  only  taken  after  a  fair  conventional  agreement  with  Spain. 
It  is  particularly  ridiculous  to  hear  Mr.  Marriott  declare  that  “the  pur¬ 
chase  of  the  Alaskan  territory  in  1867  from  Russia  was  a  more  obvious 
demonstration  of  an  imperialistic  temper.”  Besides  being  a  rather  happy 
and,  in  the  public  mind  at  the  time,  unforeseen  and  dubious  accident,  it  was 
sold  by  Russia  at  such  a  price  as  to  indicate  that  the  United  States  was 
picking  up  something  without  very  serious  effort  on  her  part.  The  Con¬ 
gress  very  nearly  refused  outright  to  appropriate  the  money  for  the  pur¬ 
chase  at  all.  There  was  no  general  national  imperialism  whatever  in  evi¬ 
dence.  Finally,  various  islands  have  been  acquired  by  discovery  and  occupa¬ 
tion.  In  none  of  these  cases  are  there  any  substantial  qualifications  to  be 
made.  This  is  the  normal  mode  of  acquisition  for  the  United  States. 

The  events  of  1846  and  1898  are  exceptions  or  partial  exceptions  here  as 
above.  New  Mexico  and  California  were  taken  primarily  by  conquest.  The 
abnormal  cause  for  that  action  is  notorious,  and  has  already  been  mentioned. 
It  remains  to  be  noted  that  steps  were  already  on  foot  in  1846  to  purchase 
these  territories  from  Mexico,  according  to  the  usual  practice  of  the  United 
States.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  true  American  policy,  one  can  but 
regret  that  the  South  did  not  give  time  for  the  normal  methods  to  be 
followed.  An  American  does,  however,  regret  it,  and  not  boast  of  it. 

As  for  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and  the  Philippines,  the  case  is  slightly  differ¬ 
ent  again.  Cuba,  of  course,  was  not  annexed  by  the  United  States,  but 
simply  freed  from  Spain.  The  Philippines  wTere  taken  by  a  combined  proc¬ 
ess  of  conquest  and  purchase.  Porto  Rico  and  Guam  were  taken  by  con¬ 
quest,  apparently.  So  much  for  the  initial  steps.  In  regard  to  all  of  these, 
however,  the  most  significant  facts  are  those  connected  with  the  method  of 
treatment  accorded  to  the  annexed  territories.  To  that  we  shall  return  in 
a  moment. 

The  next  thing  to  be  noted  is  that  the  great  bulk  of  the  territorial 
acquisitions  of  the  United  States  have  been  made  from  contiguous  territory. 
The  frontier  of  settlement  has  grown  outward  by  a  natural  process.  In 
some  cases,  defense  of  the  existing  frontier  was  a  motive;  in  some  cases 
boundary  disputes — real,  and  not  artificially  stimulated — led  to  territorial 
acquisitions.  Florida,  the  trans- Appalachian  regions,  Louisiana,  Oregon, 
California,  and  even  the  Southwest  were  reached  in  this  manner,  not  by 
overseas  adventures  or  incursions  into  the  settled  or  occupied  territories  of 
other  nations. 

In  other  words,  the  American  people  moved  slowly  and  peaceably  into 
what  were  nearly  empty  territories.  The  lands  settled  were  not  already 
occupied  by  a  population  with  a  developed  culture  and  life  of  their  own. 
No  great  numbers  of  an  alien  people  were  subjected  to  a  conqueror’s  govern¬ 
ment.  The  Indians  cannot  be  so  described.  They  were  not  entitled,  by  any 
sort  of  social  ethic  which  can  be  seriously  considered,  to  be  respected  in  their 


196  THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 

occupation  of  the  land  as  if  they  had  been  a  civilized  people.  They  could 
not  be  cited  here  in  such  a  manner.  By  and  large,  the  Americans  have 
simply  flowed  into  empty  territory;  they  have  not  conquered  and  annexed 
existing  states  or  portions  thereof. 

The  same  exceptions  are  to  be  noted  here  as  in  the  discussion  of  the 
manner  of  acquisition.  The  Philippines  and  Porto  Rico  and  the  Pacific 
islands,  and  even  Alaska,  lie  away  from  the  mainland  of  the  United  States. 
And  while  Alaska  and  the  Pacific  islands  were  largely  empty  or  inhabited 
only  by  uncivilized  natives,  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines  were  settled 
countries  and  so  was  the  Hawaiian  group.  In  this  case  the  Southwest  stands 
better  than  they,  for  it  was  both  contiguous  and  sparsely  occupied,  and 
held  in  the  vague  Mexican  Empire  rather  lightly  and  artificially. 

But  the  decisive  fact,  after  the  method  of  acquisition  itself,  is  the  method 
by  which  the  acquired  territories  have  been  treated.  In  this  the  Philippines 
and  Porto  Rico  and  the  Hawaiian  group  fare  well.  The  characteristic 
American  practice  has  been  to  incorporate  acquired  territories  in  the  Union 
on  a  basis  of  equality  with  the  original  member  States,  and  not  to  hold  them 
in  subjection  as  colonial  possessions.  This  process  was  applied  to  all  the 
acquisitions  down  to  1898.  Even  Alaska,  remote  and  unsettled,  is  on  the 
recognized  historic  route  to  statehood. 

In  the  cases  of  the  acquisitions  of  1898  that  practice  has  also  been 
followed.  Hawaii  and  Porto  Rico  have  been  given  “ territorial’’  govern¬ 
ments,  which  have  always  been  the  prelude  to  statehood,  and  they  may 
conceivably  achieve  statehood  in  the  not  distant  future.  The  Philippines 
have  been  given  “ territorial' ’  government  and  might  conceivably  follow  the 
same  path.  What  is  more  likely  to  happen,  however,  and  the  distinction 
has  its  own  significance,  is  that  the  Philippines  will  go  one  way — to  in¬ 
dependence,  while  Porto  Rico  and  Hawaii,  perhaps,  go  the  other — to  state¬ 
hood.  We  have  promised  the  Philippines  their  independence,  acting 
apparently  on  the  assumption  that  they  could  not  become  part  of  the  Union. 
They  may  be  retained  in  a  protectorate;  they  may  come  to  stand  with  Cuba, 
as  another  relinquished  conquest.  In  either  case,  the  protectorate  would 
gain  its  significance  not  so  much  in  distinction  from  a  theoretical  or 
potential  stage  of  complete  independence  as  from  the  immediately  preceding 
stage  of  conquest  and  dominion. 

From  all  of  these  facts,  the  conclusion  is  unescapable.  They  are  not 
vague  and  indefinite  ideas;  they  are  historic  facts.  They  are  irrefragible 
obstacles  to  any  attempt  to  portray  American  territorial  expansion  as  a 
process  of  imperialism. 

From  one  point  of  view  the  task  of  refuting  such  an  attempt  may 
appear  to  be  too  easy  to  have  deserved  to  take  up  so  much  time  and  energy. 
And  in  a  sense  that  is  true.  No  person  who  is  familiar  with  American 
political  life  can  take  such  a  contention  seriously.  The  people  of  the  United 
States  have  not  the  imperialistic  temper.  Except  when  on  a  sort  of  spirit- 


THE  NATURE  OF  AMERICAN  TERRITORIAL  EXPANSION 


197 


ual  spree  as  in  1846  and  1898,  they  are  frankly  embarrassed  at  such  a 
grandiose  role  in  international  politics.  Have  they  not  always  played,  or 
pretended  to  play,  a  minor  role  in  that  tragi-comedy,  even  a  silent  role? 
They  have  thrilled  at  the  idea  of  “conquering”  and  “subduing”  a  con¬ 
tinent — in  the  sense  of  exploring,  settling  and  cultivating  the  earth ;  in  that 
sort  of  imperialism  against  nature  they  have  gloried.  The  extension  of  the 
empire  of  man  over  brute  nature — that  is  American  imperialism.  As  for 
the  hard  and  greedy  international  imperialism  of  military  conquest,  for 
that  they  have  neither  the  requisite  stage  presence  in  international  relations, 
nor  the  necessary  viciousness. 


3  0112 


072392274 


ENEMY  GOODS  AND  HOUSE  OF  TRADE 
By  Thomas  Baty,  LL.D.,  D.C.L. 

I.  General 

It  is  proposed  to  examine  shortly,  in  the  following  pages,  the  preci: 
extent  to  which  a  neutral’s  commerce  with  a  belligerent  country  is  liabl1 
to  interruption  by  the  cruisers  of  the  opposite  belligerent,  apart  from  thj 
traditional  doctrines  of  blockade  and  contraband,  and  from  the  practic 
of  reprisals.  We  shall  also  eliminate  the  operation  of  the  dogma  of  con 
tinuous  voyage.  Needless  to  say,  that  dogma  is  one  wdiich  introduces  uttej 
uncertainty  into  the  realm  of  prize  law,  and  makes  it  easy  for  belligerent 
to  behave  towards  neutral  commerce  in  a  quite  arbitrary  fashion.  Whej 
combined  with  a  swollen  list  of  contraband,  its  application  amounts  to  I 
complete  control  of  commerce  by  belligerents;  and  might  best  be  met  b; 
a  friendly  war  being  commenced  between  neutrals,  who  might  thus,  perhaps 
regain  the  freedom  of  which  they  otherwise  stand  deprived.  But  taking 
the  dogma  as  it  stands,  we  cannot  but  realize  that  its  true  design  anj 
justification  is  to  restore  to  belligerents  their  old  liberty  of  seizing  enemj 
property  withdrawn  from  them  in  1856  by  the  Declaration  of  Paris.  Tha^ 
and  not  the  pernicious  influence  of  railways,  is  its  true  raison  d’etre.  Whe; 
Chief  Justice  Chase,  by  his  easting  vote  in  the  United  States  Suprerd 
Court,  laureled  the  doctrine  during  the  American  Civil  War,  it  was  wit;| 
no  idea  of  countering  the  influence  of  railways  in  his  mind.  Railway! 
were  not  important  in  that  connection.  No  railway,  at  that  time,  traversejj 
the  waters  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Nassau  was  on  an  island.  Any  influencl 
that  railways  may  have  exercised,  in  making  a  belligerent  territory  mod 
accessible  from  neutral  ports,  is  more  than  offset  by  the  enormous  powd 
of  controlling  commerce  exercised  by  the  modern  fast  cruiser — a  powd 
incomparably  greater  than  that  of  the  old  frigate  over  the  old  merchant 
man.1 

Accordingly,  if  the  continuous  voyage  dogma  be  duly  anathematize 
in  the  interest  of  a  modicum  of  decent  security  for  neutrals,  it  will  scarcelj 
be  possible  to  avoid  the  substitution,  in  some  form  or  another,  of  liberti 
to  intercept  the  enemy’s  goods  laden  on  neutral  ships.  The  neutral  in  tha 
case  will  preserve  his  ship,  will  even  get  his  freight,  and  no  harm  wi] 
be  done  to  anybody  except  the  enemy, — a  much  more  satisfactory  stal 
of  affairs  than  the  present,  when  by  a  forced  and  unnatural  series  c 

i  See,  for  succinct  statistics,  the  writer's  Prize  Laic  and  Continuous  Voyage  (Lo 
don),  1916. 


